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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
INTENTIONAL INJURY INFLICTED BY EMPLOYER
Arkansas. In Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., Inc.,'
the Arkansas Supreme Court held that under certain circumstances
an injured employee had an election to sue under the common law
or under the workmen's compensation statute. The facts in this case
were that the employee had been the subject of an intentional
assault and battery during the course of his employment by an
officer and general manager of the employer. This decision was
distinguished from Hagger v. Wortz Biscuit Co.2 where it was held
that the remedy afforded the employee under the compensation
statutes is exclusive where injury or death results from gross negli-
gence of the employer or a fellow employee. The distinguishing
fact was that in the instant case the cause of the injury was in-
tentional, whereas the act in the Hagger case was accidental. The
employee was entitled to treat the act as a severance of the em-
ployer-employee relationship if he desired.
DEPENDENCY
Arkansas. A father can be the dependent of his 18-year old son,
despite the common law right which he has to the son's earnings.
In Kimpel v. Garland Anthony Lumber Co.8 it was shown that a
considerable portion of the son's earnings was actually used by the
father to support himself and family, and the uncontradicted testi-
mony established a case of partial dependency if the son had been
twenty-one years old or more. The court said, "We think it clear
that the Act does not embrace the common-law rules of depend-
ency, at least as to minors who have reached eighteen."
WEEKLY WAGES OF PART-TIME EMPLOYEE
Louisiana. In Jarrell v. Travelers Ins. Co.4 the supreme court
held that even though an employee was working under a contract
1 ------------ Ark .............. 230 S. W. 2d 28 (1950).
2210 Ark. 318, 196 S. W. 2d 1 (1946).
3 216 Ark. 788, 227 S. W. 2d 932, 933 (1950).
4 218 La. 531, 50 So. 2d 22 (1950).
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of hiring for only one day a week, the employee was entitled to
compensation for total and permanent disability based upon a
weekly wage of six times the daily wage. This carried the inter-
pretation of the statute a step further than it had been carried in
any other decision. The nearest approaches are set out in Rylander
v. T. Smith & Son, Inc.,' where the wages of longshoremen, who
were employed intermittently, were determined on the basis of
wages for a full week, and in Calhoon v. Meridian Lumber Co.,
Inc.,6 where the injured employee had been employed only three
days a week for several months due to economic conditions. The
court held that the instant case was distinguished from Durrett v.
Unemployment Relief Committee7 and Young v. Unemployment
Relief Administration' on the facts. In those cases the employ-
ment contract was for two days a week, and the employee was
prohibited from accepting work from any other employer. Gay v.
Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation9 was stated to be not
inconsistent with the instant case in that there the employee was
compensated for a full five-day work week, and it was shown that,
with one exception, the employee had never worked more than
five days a week. Abbott v. Swift & Co.,"0 which was also cited
by the defendant, involved the question of overtime in computing
the normal daily wage; hence that decision was not inconsistent
with the instant decision.
HAZARDOUS OCCUPATION
Louisiana. The supreme court affirmed the decision of the court
of appeals in Fields v. General Casualty Co. of America,1 which
involved the interpretation of the workmen's compensation statute
with respect to the classification of a certain business as hazardous.
One of the duties of the injured employee was to load feed onto
motor vehicles owned by the employer's customers. The court held
5 177 La. 716, 149 So. 434 (1933).
6180 La. 343, 156 So. 412 (1934).
7152 So. 138 (La. App. 1934).
8 154 So. 642 (La. App. 1934).
9 191 So. 745 (La. App. 1939).
10 6 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 1942).
11216 La. 940, 45 So. 2d 85 (1950), afi'g 36 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 1948).
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that such association with motor vehicles was not sufficient to bring
the business into the statutory classification of a hazardous busi-
ness, even though in at least one other case 2 it had been held that
actual ownership of the motor vehicle by the employer was not
necessary.
DISABILITY TO PERFORM SAME WORK
Louisiana. In Scott v. Hillyer, Deutsch, Edwards, Inc., 8 the
supreme court refused to limit further the type of work which
could be performed by the injured man to preclude recovery of
compensation. The statute 4 allows compensation for partial or
total "disability to do work of any reasonable character." The
Louisiana court had interpreted 5 this to mean work of the same
or similar description to that which the employee had been accus-
tomed to perform. In the instant case the court of appeals added
the word "reasonably" before the word "similar," and the plain-
tiff objected on the ground that this definition extended the type
of work which could preclude recovery. The supreme court held
that since the statute used the same word, its use by the court of
appeals was proper.
FAILURE TO PAY-JURISDICTIONAL
New Mexico. In George v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 6 the supreme
court found that the express provisions of the statute17 made the
refusal or failure of an employer to pay the compensation pro-
vided in the act jurisdictional. The plaintiff wanted a judicial de-
termination of the permanency of his disabilities and the duration
of the benefits. It was held that, since the employer had paid the
benefits up to the date of the suit, the court had no jurisdiction.
12 Moritz v. K. C. S. Drug Co., Inc., 149 So. 244 (La. App. 1933), involving a
delivery boy who owned his own motorcycle.
1 217 La. 596, 46 So. 2d 914 (1950), afTg 38 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 1949).
14 LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1939) § 4398-1(a), (b) and (c).
15 Stieffel v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 188 La. 1091, 179 So. 6 (1938) ; Knispel v.
Gulf States Utilities Co., Inc., 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932).
16 54 N. M. 210, 219 P. 2d 285 (1950).
17 N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 57-913: "In event such employer shall fail or refuse to
pay the compensation herein provided to such workman.., it shall be the duty of such
workman ... to file a claim therefor...."
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COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-HAZARDS OF HIGHWAY-INTOXICATION
New Mexico. Various phases of the meaning of the phrase
"arose out of and in the course of employment" with respect to
the cause of the injury or death were interpreted by the supreme
court during the year 1950. In Allen v. D. D. Skousen Const. Co."8
the employee was injured while preparing breakfast at a camp
site furnished by the employer. The court held that, since there
were no other accommodations available and the employee was
required to occupy such site by his employer, the injury was
covered. In Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co."9 it was held that a head
driller, who was required to pick up and transport other drillers
to a drilling site, even though he received no compensation for
such duty except for his increased wage as head driller, was
covered while on his way to work. There was a very strong dissent
on the ground that it appeared that the transportation arrange-
ment was solely between the head driller and the other drillers. In
Parr v. New Mexico State Highway Department20 the question
whether the employee had returned to his employment duties was
decided in his favor. The court also held that where a defense of
intoxication to preclude recovery was raised, the defendant had
the burden of proving the employee's intoxication and that it was
the cause of the accident.
Calvin J. Henson, Jr.
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
Texas. The case of American General Insurance Co. v. Wil-
liams2 has a new twist on whether a carrier is liable for death
benefits where an employee is killed on the employer's premises
at a time when the employee's activities are not necessarily in fur-
therance of the employer's business.
Williams, the deceased employee, and some employees of a
18 55 N. M. 1, 225 P. 2d 452 (1950).
19 55 N. M. 81, 227 P. 2d 365 (0950).
20 54 N. M. 126, 215 P. 2d 602 (1950).
21 ------------ Tex ............., 227 S. W. 2d 788 (1950).
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road construction company had been taken to the place of work in
company vehicles. Before going to work they were engaged in a
dice game. The company had knowledge that such games of chance
regularly occurred on its premises. In fact, supervisory employees
of the company were in the habit of "shooting craps" with some
of the employees. On the day in question, a dispute over a side-bet
arose between Williams and one Thornton. During the dispute
Thornton clubbed Williams with a length of timber, causing Wil-
liams' death.
The court held that Williams' widow was not entitled to death
benefits under the law.22 Games of chance are not in furtherance
of the employer's business. There must be a causal connection be-
tween the conditions under which the work is required to be per-
formed and the injury, and the risk of injury must be incidental
to, or arise out of, the employment.2" The court stated that not to
hold for the insurance carrier in this case would be to extend the
coverage of the workmen's compensation act, a legislative and not
a judicial function.
Oklahoma. An employee who takes a truck home over the
Christmas holidays and is injured in an accident while collecting
a bill for his employer and picking up a tire for the truck is not
covered by workmen's compensation according to Mansfield v. In-
dustrial Service Co.2
4
This case seems to draw a close distinction as to whether or not
an employee is furthering his employer's business. The court rea-
soned that "in the course of employment" means performing duties
which the employee was actually employed to perform, and that
there must be a causal connection apparent to reasonable minds
between the employee's job and what he was doing at the time of
injury. It would seem that this was a mixed transaction and that
a slightly more liberal interpretation of the law would have al-
lowed recovery to the employee.
Oklahoma. A case in which the employee was more clearly not
22 Tsx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8309, § 4.
23 Safety Casualty Co. v. Wright, 138 Tex. 492, 160 S. W. 2d 238 (1942).
24 _.------- Okla .-- ,223 P. 2d 373 (1950).
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entitled to recovery is Shirley v. National Tank Co.2" An employee
was injured while making a whatnot shelf for his own use. He was
doing the work in his spare time on a power saw owned by the
company. In this case the risk was not reasonably incident to the
employment, and recovery was properly denied.
Two BUSINESSES-COVERAGE OF ONE
Texas. When an employer is conducting two separate business
enterprises and his workmen's compensation policy covers the em-
ployees of only one of the enterprises, is an employee of the non-
covered business entitled to recover for an injury under his em-
ployer's policy, or does he have a common law action against his
employer? This question was raised in Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Co. v. Christensen,2" where an employee lost the sight of
an eye while welding. The employee sued both at common law
and on the insurance policy.
The court held that an employer is not compelled to carry com-
pensation insurance on his employees and that where the employer
has two different types of business involving different risks, pay-
rolls, and premiums, he may insure those employees engaged in
one and leave his employees in the other uninsured. The rights of
an employee who sues for compensation are determined by the
specific terms of the employer's policy.27 The carrier was, there-
fore, absolved from liability for plaintiff employee's injury, but
the employee could still bring a common law action against his
employer.2"
Oklahoma. The Oklahoma compensation act provides that an
employee must be working in certain enumerated hazardous ac-
tivities in order to recover for injuries under the act.29 Two recent
cases have held that where the employee is engaged in a hazardous
activity in connection with a business not included in the list of
hazardous activities, he is entitled to recover.
25 ----------- Okla ----------- 223 P. 2d 540 (1950).
26 ----------- Tex .............. 228 S  W . 2d 135 (1950).
27 Mulkey v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 93 S. W. 2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)
er. ref.
28 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8306, § 3a et seq.
29 85 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 2.
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Both cases involved employees of retail stores which carried on
activities beyond strictly retail operations. In Dalton Barnard
Hardware Co. v. Gates30 the injured employee was the manager
of a drapery and slipcover department of the company's furniture
store. The department was equipped with a power sewing machine.
When she was loudly reprimanded by her employer, she fell and
injured her back. In Gates v. Weldon 1 a butcher shop and frozen
food locker business were carried on in connection with a grocery
business. Plaintiff employee was injured by a power saw used to
cut meat. In both cases the machinery on the premises rendered
activities hazardous under the law, and recovery was allowed."2
EXAMINATION BY PHYSICIANS
Texas. The workmen's compensation act requires that an in-
jured employee submit to reasonable examinations by physicians."
Wallace v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. 4 held that the
judge of a district court, in which an appeal from the decision
of the Industrial Accident Board is filed, has discretion to limit
this examination in a reasonable manner.
Wallace was examined and treated by two different physicians,
both of whom had examined other patients for the insurance car-
rier. At the trial the carrier sought to have a third physician exam-
ine the plaintiff. The court denied the request stating that, by pay-
ing the physicians for examining and treating the injured em-
ployee, the employer and the carrier had made these doctors their
own. Since the doctors were in no way proved incompetent, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the carrier's
request to allow further medical examination of the claimant. The
case will doubtless cause insurance companies to be more careful
in the future in the selection of physicians.
Oklahoma. The case of Liberty Glass Co. v. Lemons35 is very
30 ------...-.Okla -------------- 220 P. 2d 249 (1950).
31 --------..---Okla . ..........., 223 P  2d 372 (1950).
32 Harbour-Longmire-Pace Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 147 Okla. 207, 296
Pac. 456 (1931).
33 Tax. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8307, § 4.
4 ---- Tex -------------- 226S.W. 2d 612 (1950).
35 --------..-. Okla ........... ,217 P. 2d 516 (1950).
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similar to the Wallace case. The claimant had been examined by
eight different physicians, and the carrier sought to have a ninth
appointed to examine the claimant. The trial court's refusal to
allow further examination was held not to be an abuse of discre-
tion.
SECOND INJURY FUND
Texas. Miears v. Industrial Accident Board86 is a case of first
impression regarding the Second Injury Fund, which was created
by an amendment to the workmen's compensation act in 1947."
This fund was created for the express purpose of encouraging em-
ployers to hire handicapped workers. The statute has always pro-
vided that in the event of a subsequent injury to an already handi-
capped employee, the carrier should only be liable to the extent
of the second injury. The amendment provides that the employee
shall be entitled to be paid any other benefits to which he is en-
titled out of a specially created fund.
The claimant, Miears, lost the sight of one eye through a non-
compensable accident in 1929. In 1946 he lost the sight of his
other eye in a compensable accident. The-carrier paid the claimant
$25.00 per week for 100 weeks, which was the full extent of its
liability. The question was whether Miears was entitled to 201
weeks or 301 weeks' compensation out of the Second Injury Fund.
In other words, should the fund be given credit for 100 weeks
which would have been paid at the time of the loss of the first
eye if that injury had been compensable?
The court construed the compensation act and the wording of
the amendment to allow a full 301 weeks recovery. The court,
however, expressly refused to rule as to whether the deduction of
100 weeks would be allowed, if compensation benefits had been
paid at the time of the first injury.
Workmen's compensation statutes are usually liberally con-
strued in Texas, and the instant case is consistent with this atti-
tude.
Oklahoma. The Special Indemnity Fund of Oklahoma corre-
3 ----- Tex..---------- 232 S. W. 2d 671 (1950).
37 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon 1948) art. 8306, § 12c.
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sponds to the Second Injury Fund of Texas. The case of Special
Indemnity Fund of Oklahoma v. Hewes8" is to be compared with
the Miears case. The Hewes case held that when an employee, who
has previously been partially disabled, suffers a subsequent in-
jury, his compensation shall be determined as follows: take the
amount payable as a result of the total disability caused by both
injuries, subtract the amount that was paid by the carrier as a re-
sult of the second injury, subtract also the amount that was pro-
vided for the first injury, and then pay the remaining amount, if
any, to the employee out of the Special Indemnity Fund. Mathe-
matical formulae to determine the cumulative effects of two in-
juries are not to be used unless such formulae reasonably reflect
the degree of disability. 9
Robert L. Wright.
S 8 ----. Okla. ..--, 214 P. 2d 240 (1950).
39 Special Indemnity Fund v. Patterson -- ---- Okla .. , 217 P. 2d 536, 539
(1950).
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